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ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN. 
by 
Oscar B. Seyster. 
~NGLAND IN THE SOUDAN. 
The object of this paper is to show how the actual 
control ot, the 'Egyptian Soudan came to be in the hands 
o~ ."England. To do this it . will be .necessary to show first 
how Egyptian polltical influence has been carried into 
that portion of Africa known as the Soudan which,lying to 
the south and west of Berber,strecthes away to the great 
la~es in the interior of Africa and is drained by the 
upper Nile .and its tributBries;second,the gradual growth 
ot lu.~oJPean influence and control in Rgyptian government-
al aft'airs and the part played by "England in this 'growth; 
third,the loss of the Soudan through the Mahdist rebell-
ien and the re-conquest by the Anglo-Egyptian forces; , 
:fourth, what has been done for the Soudan by the 'English 
administration and the existing conditions there. Apart 
from ,~gypt the Soudan has rio history. Therefore any dis-
cussion concerning ~gland·s attitude toward the Soudan 
must be arrived at through England's connection with 
Egypt. The ' 'eyes of 'Europe have ever been turned upon 
~gypt and Asia Minor. The Greeks,the Romans,the Ita1ian 
UerchantS ',and the Crusaders each and all had their 1n1'111-
ence. here. As "Europe passed from the Mediaeval stages 
into the Modern the struggle between the nations for the 
~upremacy in commercial and politieal influence here has 
been 80 sharp that the finest arts of diplomacy have been 
strained to thQ utmost to prevent a clash of the rival 
powers. 
NapoleonJever watchful for a chance to strike a 
blow at his . s.trongest rival,'England,thought he saw a way 
to the c .onquest of India by first obtaining 'Egypt .Accord-
ingly on May 18,I798,thlrteen ship of the line,s1x trig- , 
stas,and twelve vessels (Of' smaller size safld 1."rom 
1'oulon.,France,carrying a 'french army under Napoleon. On 
Wuly I,1798,the expedition landed near Alexandria and,on 
July e,took that city. He rapidly gained control of Egypt 
but was compelled to return to France by the sudden turn 
of affairs there. The Freneh armw ot occupation remained, 
however"for over two years. Oa' March2,I80I,an 'Engl.ish 
army under' the cortmand of" S1,r Ralph Abercromby arri ved at 
Abukir bay. The French were defeated in the battle of 
Alexandria and on September I,I80I,surrendered the city. 
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Before the eRa of the month the last of the French troops 
had sailea' from the shores of Egypt leaving the English 
in. control. England,however,was only trying to thwart the 
plans of Napoleon ana did not care,at this time,for any 
particular influence over Egypt. It was . not long,thQrefore, 
until the English army was withdrawn. 
Just at this time there came to the front in Egypt 
a nan who was destined to wield grea t influence in "Egyptian 
af'f'airs. MehemetAli was born,in 1768,at Kaballa,a small 
seaport town,of Alpania aistrict,on the west coast of 
Macedonia. He took to military life and bec~ne an of Ticer 
in the Turkish army. He was sent to Egypt with the army 
which was to drive. out the French and rose rapi0.1y to the 
command of' the Albanian troops. By 1805 he had become an 
important factor in Egypt. He was a popular fellow and had 
become such a friend in the eyes of' the people that they 
entreated him to become their ruler. He accepted and thus 
stepped into power under the guise of the people's choice. 
The political affairs of Egypt had for a long time before 
this been dominated by a class of warriors known as the 
Mamelukes. They were f'rom European Turkey and formed a 
large part of the Turkish army in Egypt. A very sharp oppo-
sition to Mehemet Ali at once sprang up among the leaders . 
of the Mamelukes. However he succeeded,by means of treacb-
ery and deception,in murdering the most of them and by 1807 
was in complete control of lower Egypt. At this pOint he .mtr 
with a phase of politics which,at no great distant future, 
was to play an important part in his career,that is, Euro-
pean interference. In the last days of 1806 the Grenville 
ministry,in England,coneeived the idea that the ~orte was 
about to turn Egypt Over to Prance in return for her aid 
against Russia. Thinking to check this,and also to aid 
Russia against Napoleon,it was decided to send an expedi-
tion to Egypt. In laying their plans,however,they strangely 
underrated the powers of Mehemet Ali and sent only between 
four and five thousand men. On March 17,1807,a landing was 
made OR th coast of Egypt without opposition. Mehemet Ali 
was at that ti~e in upper Egypt engaged in a campaign 
against the last of the Mameluke Beys. The city of Alex-
andria was taken with the loss of' only seven men,but within 
the city no provisions were found. A detatchment of twelve 
hundred men was dispatched to Rosetta,to obtain supplies. 
They were entraped by a detachment of Mehemet Ali's troops 
(and 80me four 
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3. 
hundred of them killed;the rest escaped to Alexandria. An 
expedition of twenty-five hundred men was now sent to 
besiege Rosett~. For thirteen days they bombarded the city. 
Then news . came of the ~pproach of large reenforc!3ments from 
tl1e upper Nile. Mehemet Ali had formed a truce wi th the 
~eluke Beys and had induced· them to join f"orceswith him 
~n order to drive the f'oreigners out of Egypt. On hearing 
of' this the English commanders decided to return to 
Alexandria. They were prevented from doing so,however,bY 
the advance of Mehemet Ali's forces. A battle took place in 
which · the English were defeated with a loss of' nine hundred 
men. In the campaign which f'ollowed Mehemet Ali was victo-
rious ~J and by September, 1807·, the last of the English army 
had left the 'Egyptian shores. nlm 
Mehemet Ali was now supreme in Egypt and for thirtYA 
y,ars he ruled with a f'i~ hand. Under his admdnistration 
Egypt advanced rapidly. He organized his army on the 
~ropean plan and installed a system of' general irrigation. 
In I8I9,hearing that anarchy prevailed in the Soudan, he 
determined to introduce there the benifits of' regular 
governmjnt ~nd civilization and at the same time occupy his 
troops. -He accordingly ordered his son, Ismail, to invade the 
country~ Ismail,in I823,reached Khartoum,at the junction 
of' the White and Blue Niles,and made it the capital city 
of' the Egyptian Soudan · which at this time extended only a 
shor.t distance beyond Xhartoum itself. Thus for the first 
time, in modern times, "Egyptian int'luence was extended into _ ..
those regions which were destined to play such an important 
part in "Egyptian affairs of the tuture. · By 1830 Mehemet Ali , 
was lookinj with ambitious eyes toward Arabia and Asia Mino~ 
He claimedA\he Sultan had promised him the rule of Syria in 
return ~or his assistance in putting down a Greek revolt. 
'Encouraged by the friendship ot' France~he sent his adopted 
son,Ib\q,rahim,with an army into Syria,under pretext of sub-
duing fl.. r .evol t. This action brought on a quarrel wi th the 
ministers of tbe Sultan who,in 1832,declared him a rebel. 
Accordingly Mehemet Ali,pretending to be a t'aithful servant 
of the Sultan and wishing only to rid himot' his bad 
ministers,ordered his army to march upon Constantinople. 
However,the Powers suddenly decided that matters had gone 
f'ar enough and active preperations were begun to check the 
progress of Mehemet Ali. By the treaty ot' I840,between the 
Porte and the European Powers, especially 'England and Russia, 
as France was not willing to accede to the agreement,a 
peace was imposed upon Mehemet Ali and he was foreed to 
give up Syria. Egypt,however,was praetially turned over to 
~~~----------------------------.-------------------.--- -.-------------~ 
I.Report on the ~oudan,by Lieut.-Col. ~tewart. Blue Book, 
'Egypt Uo.II,(I883). 
4. 
his rule and for _the rest of his active life he devoted 
himself to the ' developement of his country along social and 
material lines. In 1848,whea eighty years of age,he was 
overtalren by a mental ,. 1J)8.1~dy and the responsibilities or 
government were . . assumed by his adopted son,Ibrahim Pasha. 
Mehemet Ali lived until I849,but Ibrahim Pasha had 
pre-deceased him and Abbas,son ot Ibrahim,as~en. ded to the 
vice-regal throne '. Al though born in "Egypt Abbas was ~ Turk 
ot the Yorst type. Ignorant,cowa~dly,sensual,fanatic~and 
opposed to retor.msof every sort. He ruled for six years. 
One night,in July I854,he was strangled to death while 
asleep. Said Pe,sha,the third son of' Mehemet Ali,succeeded 
Abbas upon the throne of Egypt. He was an amiable and 
liberal minded prince,yet lacked the vigorous' intelligence 
and torce ot character ot his , tather. During his reign the 
~uez canal was begun. Through the personal efforts ot M. de 
Lesseps,a French engineer,a commission was appointed to 
investigate the practicability of a ship canal ,connecting 
the Mediterranean and R.d 'eas,aeross the isthmus ot Suez. 
Rngland opposed the eanal on the grounds that it would be 
detrimental to her interest in South Atrica. "English 
engineers were,nevertheless,placed on the commission. This 
commission met in Paris,June I856,to make its report. The 
views of the English engineers, that the canal should be 
raised twenty-seven feet above sea level with a system of 
loeks at each~nd,were rejected and the report of the 
majority,recommending the system now in operation,was sub-
mitted to the Viceroy. M. de Lesseps spent the next two 
years in holding conferences and in preliminary steps 
toward/.obtaining the necessary funds for carrying out the 
plans~ ~The stock of the canal company was d+vided into 
400,000 shares. 176,602 shares were reserved to the Viceroy 
of Egypt;85,506 were disposed of in England,Austria,Russia 
and the United ~tates;all the rest were placed in Prance. 
Said Pasha died in I863,and was succeeded by his 
nephew,Ismail Pasha, the second son of Ibrahim Pasha. Ismail 
was the fi.rst Viceroy to bear the title ot "Khedive". He 
was an intelligent and energetic man, but given to great 
extravagance in both personal and governmental affairs. It 
was his extravagance that plunged Egypt into that ruinous 
debt which practically ~de her the dependency she ~s,and 
which is still one of the great money problems of Rurope. 
During his reign,in 1869,the Suez canal was opened to 
traffic and,strangl_y enough, the first ships to pass 
through it were tl'y' ing the flag of 'England,the<. one nation 
. 
I. "The ~uez Canal",by A. Langel. Nation January 4,1900. 
Vol.70; pp.7. 
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practioes on the part or the ruling classes,all contrived 
~o rapidly and .greatly increase the public debt of "Egypt 
Lord Milner t.lls~~hatt"when Ismail came to the throne i~ 
I86~,the debt .or igypt was only a little over three million 
pounds ~terling. The ennial revenue or the country was 
amply sufficient to meet all needfulexpenditure,yet by the 
end of 1876 the debt had risen to eighty-nine millions. It 
had been increased nearly thirty-fold in . thirteen years. 
Practically all or the loans were contracted with ~ngli8h 
and French banking htuses with interst from six to twelve 
percent at first and later as high as eighteen and twenty--
eight percent. It is appalling to think that a country or. 
six million inhabitants and only five million acres or 
cultivated land had added to its burdens at the rate or :. 
seven millions a year. And at the same time the taxation or 
the land had been increased by something like fifty per cent 
There is nothing in the financial history of any country 
to equal this carnival of extravagance and oppression: 
. Until 1815 interest on the debt had . been promptly 
paid. Suddenly, th& Khedive round that he could not satisty 
his . cred1tors~ .He must have more money. "On November 26,-. 
1875,it was officially anouhced that the British Govern- . 
ment ·had purchased for $20,000,000 the 176,602 sha.r~8 rep-
resenting the Khedive t s interes.t in the Suez canal. The -
news of this transaction created intense excitement both 1n 
England and on the Continent. MUoh. fear was expressed b7 f ' 
the other powers that the holding of such a preponderence 
of the canal stock woUld give ~ngland the virtual suzerain-
ty of Rgypt. , Their fears were,in fact,well grounded for,be. 
aides selling t .he shares or the Suez eanal stock to the . -
~ngllsh Government,the Khedive also applied officially to . 
Rngland to send him two gentlemen competent to undertake 
full charge or Egyptian finances. The fullest power and 
every information was promised to these new officials. ~he 
English Gov.rnment complied with his request, intrusting the 
mission to Mr. Cave. He accompanied by Colonel Stokes,one 
~inancial and two political s8cretaries,and a number or 
clerks arrived at Alexandria late in December 1875. They 
were received with great honer. The Governor of Alexandria 
waited upon them immediately upon their arrival. The Min-
ister of Finance came down :from 8airo· in a - special train . 
which he placed at the disposal ot Mr.Cave,who proceeded 
at onoe to the seat of government. 
31n March,1876,Mr.Cave made his report. H. showed 
that loans had been made at ruinous rates of interest. He 
criticised the past administration of "Egyptian finances and 
I~ "England in ~gyptW;AlfredMilner: pp.I77. 
2. "Edinburgh Review,January 1876; Vol.I43, pp.250. 
3. Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1876. . 
I It was reported that the Khedive had first offered his 
shares to the French Government which had ret'used to pur-
chase, fearing that such a move aould lead to fresh com-
plications with Germany. 
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and laid bare the causes ' which had brought about the state 
ot atrairs then existing. ae round the revenues ot the 
country alre.ady inadequate to meet the demands or the debt, 
and ,such cond;i.tions , exi$ting that the amoJlIlt ot revenue ' 
wo:u14 become, less and less each year'.' He s'howetd the prac- . 
,ticabili ty ot consolidating the ' whole debt ,with a diminut-
ion of_the rates of intereBt;suggesting the conversion of 
the debt into a 8tock bearing seven per cent interest,and 
the apPointmen~ ot a person,who should inspire confidence, 
at the head or a board or control to supervise the COllect-
ion ot tax~s. This plan met with considerable opposition ' 
trom the 80ntinental Powers,especially France.Nevertheless, 
on May 25,I876f the Khedive issued a decree tor the unifi-
cation or- the public debt./This decree provided tor the, 
issue ot seven per cent bonds (with interest trom July 15, 
1876) redeemable at par wi thin s ixty-ti va years, wi,th half 
yearly drawings;coupons ' not to be subject to taxation by 
the Egyptian Government. Both co~p6ns and bonds were to be 
paid in gold without deduction,at Ca~ro,Paris,or London. 
A commission was apointed,for liquidating the public debt, 
which was to begin its work on June 10,1876. Private holders 
of ~gyptian obligations in England and France,however,held 
that such an arrangement sacrificed their interests to thoee 
of a rew heaqs of .. ~ establishments,and refused to 
accept. the sixty-rive year bonds as a fair payment ror the 
s'ur~ties they already held. Accordingly,on invitation from 
the Khedive/another commission,consiatlng ot Mr. Goshen,s 
ror.mer Ininister from ~ngland;and M. Joubert,director ot the 
Paris Bank,visited ~gypt in September to ' investigate more ' 
definite measures for securing the loans. The chief point 
ot their report,ot importance to ' us,is the provision for 
the appointment ot a ContrOller-General ot revenue and a 
Controller-General on , the pUblic ' debt, who should be 
respectflr"lly an "Englishman and a Frenchman. To these men 
was to be given the nomination ot the general tax collector 
ot the whole ' land,in .tntlre independence of the Egyttlan 
Minister of Finance. The plans set forth in this report 
weri installed by the Khedive in a decree issued November 
18,1876. " , . ' 
, Atfairs,hoYever,dld not run very smoothly. By the 
tall ot 1877 all revenues had largely fallen oft. The great 
question at stake now became the maintenance or diminution 
of the interest on the public debt;the ' Egyptian Government 
having proposed to reduce the interest. It was thought by 
many,both in and out of " 'Egypt, that 1;he public officiale had 
acted dishonest1y.*The Commission of the Public Debt after 
I. Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1876. -
I The "Caisse de la Dette",or Commission ot the Public Debt 
established by decree or the Khedive,May 2,I876,was an 
international commission ror the control of the revenue 
devoted to the payment of the int_rest on the debt. 
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much negotiation 8ucceeded,in January 1878,in gaining the 
sanction ot the Khedive to an inquiry into the receipts of 
the (lovermnent. He. refused however to submi t the expendi-
tures to any examination whatever. Accordingly,in~February, 
the Commission ot the Public Debt called. on the Minister of 
Fjnance to proauce his books and disclose the trUe :f'eceipt4. 
They held that , they were 1mpowe~d to take such a step by , 
the decree ot November 18,1876. Their claim was upheld by 
the international court,and on March 30, the Khedive issued 
a ~~cree approving a commission ot inquiry and ~mpowering 
it~lnvestigate all the elements ot the financial situation. 
It also bo~n~ all ministers and officials of the government 
to furnish the commission,at its request,an~ and all infor-
mation • On August 20,I878,this commission made its report, 
showing the complete system of financial mana~ent with all 
its fa_Its. In conclusion the report proposed a number of 
specific financial and administrative reforms all of which 
tended to ' limit the authority of the Khedive and his native 
ministers. The chief reforms were;that no taxes shall be 
imposed or gathered without a law,authorizing them, being 
promulgated. that future legeslation may extend taxation to 
for6igners;and that there shall be an efficient control 
over the tax collectors. The Khedive,on August 23,I878f in 
a speech before the Commission of Inquiry gave assurances 
that then proposed re:t'orms should be .carried out. He accord-
ingly intrusted Nubar Pasha with the formation ot a new 
ministry. In this ministry the Minister af Finanee was Mr. 
Rivers Wilson,an "Englishman';and the Minister ot PUblic Work 
M.de Bl1gnierea,a Frenchman. . 
This newly e,tablished Government ran along very 
smoothly for a time. ,'In the first days of February,1879,the 
Cais88 issued its report showing that the debt had only 
been reduced $3,275,000 sinee 1876. Taxes were not being 
reduoed very much and many ot the official~ salaries had not 
been paid. February 18,a public demonstration ot a rather " 
serious character took place in' Cairo. After an ordinary 
council ot the ilinis.ters,Nubar Pasha and Mr .Rivers "ilsom., 
on leaving in a . ,carZ;:age,we:te stopped by a large thrrong of 
armed officers clamoring tor long arrears of salary. The 
two ministers were grossly insulted and forced to go back. 
The crowed was finally dispersed by a regiment of so1diers 
and many arrests made. On the following day Nubar Pasha otf 
ered his resignation which was accepted aa once by the . 
Khedive who had a profound aver"on for Nubar. The Khed1ve 
had called him to the head of the ministry at a time when 
the 'European Governments demanded assurance of security in 
..... ",... .... 
I.App1eton's Annual Cyclopaedia,1880. 
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the management of affairs. It was thought then, that the 
Khedive would get rid of him as soon as possible. 
The neYs of the acceptance of Nubar's - resignatlon 
caused considerable excitement in London and Paris. It was 
believed in these centers that the Khedive had stirred up 
this public demonstration in order to get rid of Nubar. 
"England ~mmediately proposed to Prance that ' jOint action be 
taken looking to the reinstatement of Nubar. Accordingly,on 
March 8,I879,a jOint note was placed before the Khedive,eon- ', 
taining the conditions for the settlement of the crisis. 
Chief among these conditions was the right of Mes81lBcWilson 
and de Blignieres to 'veto all propositions which were not 
acceptable to them. Finally after cons1~erable negotiation 
a new ministry was formed,in the - second' week of March,with 
Prince' .Tewfik, the eldest son of Ismail Pasha,a tits head. 
Messrs.Wilson and de Biignleres being retained as Mini~ters 
of Finance and PUblic Wons. This l', arrangemen t,however, was . 
not destined to a long existanee. On April 7,a revolution 
took place,a peaceful one it is true but one which was for 
the moment the complete undoing of the dual control. This 
revolution was the climax of the following series of events_ 
Masers. W1l~on and de Blignierss ,acting with~Mr.Baring and 
the Caisse,having found it impossible to meet all the de-
mands of the public debt decided upon a plan for the equit-
able reduction or the claims of' all c1asses of creditors 
and submitted it to the Khedive. The Khedive,however, pro-
p s ed a counter project giving special terms to the holders 
or the fl0ating debt. This scheme was supported by a petit-
ion signed by a great number of "Egyptian ofricials both . 
polItical and relegious. Naturally the two schemes clashed. 
It was clearly a revolt,on the part of the Khedlve,against 
~uropean inf1uence and all Egypt was on his side. Prince 
Tawfik resigned the presidency ot the ministry and the Khed-
ive dismissed Wilson and de Blign1eres. ThM8 gentlemen, 
however, refused to resign their posts unless authorized to 
do so by their respective Governments. An official state-
ment was promulgated by the Khedive declaring that he,co~ 
plying with t,h~ daily gro~ing nation~l feeling,had decided 
to maKe the ministry pure1y Egyptian;which he did under the 
Presidency of Sherif Pasha. 
The first work of this new ministry was to issue 
a decree,on April 22,I879,declaring a suspension of the 
payments of interest and the nec •• sity of a general reduct-
ion o~ interest. The revolution of the Khedive and espe- , 
e1ally this one move on the part of the newly rormed Gov-
ernment created an intense excitement in Europe and led to 
(."t,../ls Y. #= ~1r 'K. Baring was at this time English C5n:et:i-General in 
'Egypt. 
-
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negotiation between France and England as to what should be 
done next • . They. desired . the establ.ishment of' a good admin-
tstra tion in 'Egypt not . so much out of .co.nsideration tor the 
bond holders a~ fOr .thetac.ttaa t .a good .administra tion 
would .. give . to no 'ower a pretext for . intervening in . "Egypt-
ian. affairs on .the plea of protecting the interests of its 
subjects. Theretore the exclusion of .. thw European el'ment 
from the ministry was utterly unacceptable to them. Accord-
ingly instructions were sent to the agents of the two Gov-. 
ernments,and at the same time communicated to the Porte, , 
stating that France and Englamd re.garded a good adminis-
tration in "Egypt as indispensable to their inter es ts and 
those of all foreign residents ; and that such an administra-
tion did not seem feasible without the presence of the two. 
Europeans 'in the "Egyptian ministry. They therefore invited 
the Khedive to comply as promptly as posible witb their 
demands and hand over the ' portf'olios of Finance and Public 
Wokks . to the English and French representatives. This was 
not the most pleasing invitation i~ginable to extend to 
a wou1d be independent ruler and) as the note did not have 
in any sense a threatening tone, the Khedive did not comply. 
In the 1atter part of Apt'il,1879,an offer was made by the 
Sultan to depose Ismail ' Pasha and appoint Halim Pasha,uncle 
of 18mail~as SllcceSSor. This proposal did not meet .wi th 
the favor of France and was thererore _not . accepted. By June 
proteste against the condition of affairs in ~gypt had come 
from most of the European Po_ers. The Khedive was counseled 
to voluntarily abdicate;the Powers ' promising to support his 
son,Prince Tewfik.,as his successor. The Khedive desired 
this promise in wri ting but was refused. Accordingly he ". 
would not listen to any suggestion of abdication. On June 
19,however,the English and French Consuls-Goneral went 
together to the palace and demanded the . abdication of the 
Khedive. Ismail asked to be . allowed forty-eight hours in 
order to communicate with the Porte -before giving his reply 
The result was that,on the 26th of June,the Sultan signed 
a firman deposing Ismail Pasha in favor of his son Prince 
MOhammed Tewfik,who was proclaimed Khedive of Egypt,as Tew~;k 
the flrst,at six o'clock on June 26,1879 • 
. Thus we see Egypt apparently ready to start on a 
new era. Yet the first official mOve made - by Tewfik caused 
great dissatisfaction on the part of the Powers. He created 
a ministry composed enti~ely of ~gyptians,under Sherif 
Pasha,and torbade Nubar Pasha, the protege of the Powers,re-
turning to ~gypt. Immediately England and France brought 
-_.-_.--.----------------. --- -
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pressure to bear upon the Khedive and this ministry was 
dismissed. On August 1S.,1879, a new and more agreeable one 
was f'ormed with the Kheo.ivehimself as president. In sept-
ember Mr. Baring and MJde BIlgnieres were chosen as Con- . 
tro~l~rs-Genera:I of. Fihances.7.Their appointment was made 
ofi~clal,on November II, by a de.c.ree in which the Khedi va 
granted to the 6ontrollers full powers to investigate into 
every branch of' the public service;and binding all minister3 
and of'ficials to furnish them,on demand)any and all inform-
ation. These Controllers-General were to take the rank of . 
ministers and could only . be removed by their Own Government, 
Once more Egyptian af'fairs were dominated by European influ-
ence and by January,1880,it lookedJfor the first time since 
the dual control had been establishedJas though conditions 
in Egypt would assume a def'inate and permanent shape. Never 
bef'ore had the hope of a final arrangement of the financial 
situation in Egypt been so well founded. In this same month 
the Controllers-General submitted to the Khedive a report 
on the financial conditions and suggested that,in oreer to 
bring affairs into a more def'inate control,a line of demark-
ation should be drawn at December 31,1879. All debts prior 
to this date must be setteledby liquidation;the terms of 
which should bei'mbodied in a law,whose conditions shall be 
binding on . all concerned,so that the Egyptian Government 
could never be sued for claims which had accrued before 
1880.~uch · a law should be drawn up · and submitted to the 
European Powers for theirsanctiori.~he Khedive accepted 
this plan and,on April 5,I880,an International Committee 
ot Liquidation was appoi-nted by him,the "European Powers con-
curring. This Committee consisted of representatives ot the 
Rnglish,French,Italian,Austrian,German,and Egyptian governR 
ments;with Sir Rivers Wilson (Engliah) as president. After. 
making a careful and thQrough investigation of the eondit-
10n of affairs this Committee was to draw up a law of 
liquidation. The sittings of the Committee were to be 
attended by the representatives of the international tri-
bunals • . The five 'European goverrunents represented on this , 
Committee,having expressed their acceptance of such a law, 
would collectively request the adhesion of the other Powers. 
The Committee completed its work on July 1,I880,and the law 
drafted by it was immediately signed by the Khedive and of-
ficially promulgated. It was at once accepted by the Powers. 
During 1880 many reforms were 1ntt6~uced in Egypt, 
at the suggestion of the Controller8-Genera~,which added 
greatly to the welfare of the country and its people. The 
"Mukabala",which was an arrangement instituted by Ismail by 
1 '.Stateman's Year Book,IS8I. 
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which large proprietors,by paying certain assesments,could 
purchase a partial immunity rrom the land tax for all time, 
had beed abolished and the land. tax revised. The poll tax 
had been done a.way wi:thand twen:ty:...eight other small but 
vexatious taxes had been .abolished. Tbe time. for .the pay-
ment of taxes had been so arranged that the collection came 
j.ust at harvest time when the people would feel the burden/ , 
the least '. The practice of paying taxes in kind was done 
away with. The tar~ff had been thoroughly regulated and 
placed under better direction. The education of the people, 
a matter hitherto sadly neglected,had been tqken hold of' 
and a commission appointed to set forth plans. In spite of' 
external complications Egypt was profiting by the dual con-' 
trol. However,the situation of Egypt under this internat- . 
ional control was not a natural one;and. had the people been 
of a less docile' and p~aceable nature it could never have : 
been established. In I875 we have seen the supervision of 
the entire administration,the management of :finances,and 
the practical control of all departments transfered to the 
hands of Europeans at the dictation of the foreign Govern-
ments,chiefly France and England. ~hey with Austria and Italy 
were to choose the four commissioners who made up the 
"Caisse de Is Dette". In 1880 we see France and England 
choosing and forcing upon the Khedive the joint Controllers-
General who . could not be removed save by their own Govern-
ments. Besides these Controllers,who practically had a veto 
on everthing,and the public debt officers we find the 
judgeships of the international courts~the customs, the 
railways, the telegraphs,the harbor of Alexandria and the Su-
ez canal ports,the coast guard,the lighthouses,all directed 
by executive officers either French- or English. Thus Rgypt 
had become a ward of the Christian Powers, there being four-
teen Governments that claimed the right of intervention, 
with France and England acting as trustees ror the rest. 
The interest of all concerned demanded a good administra-
tion in Egypt and there was but one way or obtaining it and 
that was by unity of action within certain limits. All was 
not harmony~ hewever,among the Powers and the rivalry 
between France and England for influence was some times 
very bitter. Prance by selecting able and hard working 
officials had gained the stronger foothold in the adminis-
tration. The foreign orr-icers had,for the most part,pre-
f'ormed their duties faithfully and capably,and their advent 
had been- a benison to Egypt. , . 
Yet the very success of the foreigners in extri-
. eating 
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the country f'rom the political and ~inancial quicksand into 
which it had ra11en,and in creating a cont'idence ror its 
ruturet.was the % thing .that chafed the 'Egyptians the 
moet. They saw their government taken out or· their own hands 
and all important posts filled by foreigners. The m9st irk:e 
aome thing of all was the enormous salaries received by the 
officers. Salaries Which would have been enor:mous in any . 
country but Which in 'Egypt were absolutely unheard or. The 
Khedive countanced it all because he knew it to be for the 
best interest of his co~ntry. Yet he was intensely patrioti~ 
thoroughly 'Egyptian in his t'eelings)and above all a devout 
Mohammedan. He therefore closely guarded against the devel-
opement of any foreign interests other than in a gover.ment. 
al way. This bitterness toward outside interference had its 
natural outcome in a national movement which took active 
torm in 1881 ,and which had its chief center in the army. 
As the army was the department of government which had been 
least touched by foreign influence,it was natural that the 
movem nt should center there. A bitter opposition arose in 
the armw when an attempt was made to replace the chief 
native ofricers with Turks~ A mutiny of troops broke out 
in Cairo on ~ebruary 2,188I,and a demand was ' made ror the 
dismissal of Osman Pasha,the Minister of War. The chie~ 
leader or this mutiny was a Colonel of one of the regiment~ 
by name Ahmed Arabi Bey. He was a true Egyptian and believdf 
thoroughly in the cry which afterwards became tipical with 
the rebellion he headed,"Egypt for the Egyptians". He con-
ceived the idea of inciting the army to demand popular reI!" 
forms,and the step once taken became its natural leader. He 
held the universal confidence of the a~ and soon won the 
devotion of the people. On February 9,1881, a document/sign 
by Arab~demanding the dismissal of the ministry,a eonsti-
tution,an increase in the army to its rull limit,and the . 
abolition or the Controllers-General was presented to the 
Khedive. The demand was backed up with a threat to depose 
the Khedive if it was not granted. This move brought about 
a change in the ministry under the puesidency of Sherif Pash4, 
and a promise that the demands of the army,with the except-
ion of its increase, should be carried out. Again Europeans 
began to fear for their invested dollars and there was talk 
of sending a jOint expedition to Egypt to restore order. 
The possibility of complications,however,prevented this.Any 
aotion on the part of the Rultan was strongly opposed by 
France,Yho claimed she did not want to unite the Egyptian 
and the Ratt.rn question. Nevertheless negotiation between 
._... Ib __________________ ~~ __________ --
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the Sultan and the Khedive were carried out in secret. As 
a counter move to this secret intrigueing an "English and a 
French ironclad were stationed at Alexandria on October 6, 
188I.~England was willing that Turkey should send troops to 
"Egypt to surpress the army revolts, but France strongly op-
po~ed it and England gave in. The Sultan remonstrated again8t 
thIs last move on the part of the Powers;holding that Egypt 
was again quiet and that the presence of the ships might 
cause some agitation which would lead to a general revolt. 
The Powers replied that it disorder was at an'-. end the 
Turkish envoys werre no longer needed and that their recall 
would be rollowed by the withdrawal of the ships. The Turk-
ish commissioners were suddenly recalled and on October 20, 
the ironclads sailed away. 
The national movmnent resulted in the calling to-
gether of the Chamber ot Notables on December 26,1881. This 
assembly at once prepared a project which would give them 
tull constitutional powers. They declared that the control 
and liquidation arrangements were inviolable. Yet they 
demanded that the budget be submitted to them. They also 
demanded the initiative in legoslation and the right to 
investigate the conduct of all officials. It very soon' 
became evident who was behind this national movement~ Arabi 
Bey was pushing more and more to. the front until,on .January 
4,I882,he was taken into the cabpet as assistant Minister 
or War. The demands ot the Chamber of Notables and of Arabi 
however,were met by a firm opposition on the part of the 
Controllers-General, backed by their respective Governments. 
4n identioal note from England and France was presented,on 
Janua~ 7,I882,contalning the following determined statement. 
'"The two Goverrnents are closely associated in their deter-
mination to ward off,by their united efforts,all causes of 
internal and external complications which might menace the 
order ot things established in Egypt. They have no doubt 
that the publicly expressed assurances of their intention 
in this respect will contribute to prevent dangers which , -
the Khedive's government might have to dread, which dangers, 
moreover,would certainly find England and France united to 
tace them." ' 
France urged that action be taken at once and went 
so rar 8S to detail marines for the expedition. England, 
however,would not hear to this and proposed that the Porte 
be allowed to establish order in ~gypt but France again 
flatly refused. Just at this time there came a change of 
ministry in France and with it a slight change in policy. 
# Lord Grenville,in a dispatch dated November 4,I88I,de-
clared the policy of England in Egypt as opposed to all 
intervention and in support of the native autonomous gov-
ernment within the limits and rights accorded by the Sultan 
in his ' rirman of I879,which established Tawfik on the 
throne. And as opposed to the seperation of Egypt from 
Turkey. 
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Although she still re~used to allow the Porte to intervene 
she suddenly proposed that the Nationalists be allowed to 
attemptd the reforms they had at heart. England refused thi~ 
although the Nationalists gave every promise that "Egypt's 
duties to ' foreigners and foreign ' interests should be held 
as sacred. Just why the British Government ~ i~as it claime~ 
at that time ~ it had no ulterior purpose in view,refused to 
allow any attempt toward constitutional government in Egypt 
is a question which will probably 'never be det'inately ans-
wered. However,on 'February 3,I882l'a sudden and decisive ' 
step was taken by the Chamber of Notables. They demanded 
either th granting of constitutional powers,or the tGrma-
tion ot a new ministry with their choice of certain min-, 
iaters. Sherif Pasha,the president of the then existing 
minl s try,immediately resigned and a ' ministry favorable to 
the Notables was ' formed wi th Ara.bi Pasha as Minister off.:r. 
War and Marine. At a time when the army was the controlling 
element in the oountry, the folio of Minister of War meant 
practieally the ministerial control. With such a man as 
Arabi Pasha in this positiom and the ministry and the 
Chamber ot Notables united against the Khedive it is not 
surprising that matters came to. a sudd~n cris's. Five hun-
dt-ed promotions were made in the army Wjthin three months. 
Plans were made for increasing the army to 20,000 men and 
tor fortIfying the coast. The Khedive broke off all rela-
tion with the ministry and the ministry would listen to ' 
nothing from the ContrOllers-General. England and France be 
came excited and,to complicate matters more,decided upon a 
jOint naval demonstration. On May 20,I882J.' _~combined 'Eng-
li sh and Prenoh fleet anchored in the harbor of Alexandria. 
Warlike preparations in Egypt went rapi~y on. A councilor 
war was held at Cairo and the leading 8enerals took oath to 
pro.tect their country against foreign interventio.n. In com-
plianc e with an ultimatum from the Powers in contro} the . 
newly tor.med ministry had resigned. B~t these officers now 
deolared they would obey no orders except those of Arabi 
and ' the Khedive was compelled to restore him as Minister of 
War. With all this warlike demonstration and the prospects 
of the deliverence of' Egypt trom the forei$ners,the popular 
pass ion began to. rise. All the resentment{hat~ed,and jeal-
ously ot the people of Alexandria,where the arrogance of 
the foreigners and the privileges enjoyed by them goaded ' 
t he most,came out on June II,i 11 a riot in the streets of 
t hat city. An Arab mob invaded ' the European fluarter and 
were me t by armed resistance. About seventy ~ropeans and 
--------------------·-.------______ ~f..,q~~ ___ 
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six or seven hundred Arabs were killed. All the Europeans 
who could do so left the city at once. It was ·estimated 
that Arabi had placed aver six thousands men in the city 
and wokk on .. the fortifications was being rapidly pushed to 
completion. -
A conference of the agents of the Powers which met, 
June 23,I882,at Therapia on the Bosphorus acknowledged the 
right or the Sultan to put down the revolt in Egypt.England 
and France saw that they were losing their hold on 'Egypt . 
yet could not determine upon any definite action. However 
a sudden move in a semi-independent manBBr on the part of 
Sir Beauchamp Seymour , admiral of the British fleet, suddenly 
cleared matters up. On May I5,I882,instructions had been 
aent to him to land a force i-f necessary to protect the 
Khedive. Aoting upon this slight authority he took the step 
Which gave England the control of Egypt. On July 6,he pre-
tended .. suddenlY~discover that the fortlficatlons,which . 
had been under construction since May 29',were an imminent 
danger to his ships. He accordingly sent an ultimatum de-
manding that opperationa should cease or he would becom- . 
pelled to destroy the works. Great excitement prevailed in 
the city as a result of this ultimatum and finally the 
60nsuls of the other Powers concerned .obtained a promise 
that the work should be discontinued. However on the night 
of July 8, Seymour discovered that the work was being car-
ri ed on under cover of darkness. Declaring this to be a 
breach of engagement he ordered,on July 9,under pain of 
bombardrnent,that the forts be temporarily surrendered to 
the English,within twenty-four hours,to be dismantled. It 
was very evident how such a demand would be met by the 
~gyptians •• xK .ccordingly the ships or all other Powers and 
strangely enough the French ironclads withdrew from the 
harbor. At daybreak on July II,the English ships took their · 
posi tions and cleared for action. At half paase.d seven the 
signal was given to open fire. All day long until half pas.--
.. five in the evening the bombardment continued. Then as ~ 
the fortifications were completely distroyed the fireing 
ceased. At one o'clock on the following day the white flag 
was hoiated by the Egyptians. Negotiations for the surrend-
er were prolongedn into the night when the city was seen 
to be on fire in many places. Marines were haat~ly landed 
but toolate. The ' city wasnearly dtstroyed and Arabi and his 
army had escaped. The first shot fired by the English had 
practioally made Arabi Pasha ru.ler of "Egyptians, ''he Khedive 
being regarded as a mere tool of England. !he revolt was 
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now a certainty and ~ngland was left to crush it unaided. 
It took General Wolseley with 21,000 men,fifteen months to 
put down this revolt;but when,at Cairo on ~eptember 14,1883 
Arabi Pasha surrendered unconditionally ' the rebellion was 
at an end. France at once prepared to resume her share in 
~he control. England however,had no such intentions. Deter@ 
mination,prompt action,and success had given Egypt to her . 
and she chose to control alone. 
We have now seen how England became supreme in the 
control of Egypt;and have for the time lost sight of the 
real object,the Soudan. When last we noted it ,in 1874~ the 
Khedive had just appointed General Gordon as Governor- , 
General with instructions to stamp out the slave traffic 
and organize the administration, which had become very cor-
rupt under the Turkish-Egyptian officials. For two years ' 
Gordon remained in the Soudan and these regions now became 
the scene of continual military movements. A sudden and de~ 
cided check was placed upon the slave trade and justice W$S 
placed within reach of all. The Soudan was now becoming 
better known to the world. European explorers were rapidly 
bringing to light the secrets of central Africa and condit~ 
ions in the Soudan could be better understood. By 1876 
Gordon had affairs there well in hand. In this year,.] ....... , 
because of ill health,ha was compelled to leave the scene 
of operations and go back to Cairo. He had scarcely turned 
his back,however,when the Soudan returned to its old con-
dition. The slave traffic was resumed. The Egyptian offi~ 
oia18 again assumed control and, eager to make up for oppor-
tuniti8s lost while Gordon held the reins, became more cor-
rupt than ever. Complaints soon began to come in from 
Europe aga inst such conditions and,in February 1877 scarce-
ly a year after he had left Xhartoum,Gordon was prevailed · 
upon to return and take up the administration of the Soudan 
Gordon was received at Khartoum with great enthus-
iasm. He was liked by the people because of his just deal-
ings. For two years he worked with great vigor. The Khedive 
in appointing him Governor practically turned the Soudan 
over to his personal central making him free to govern as 
he pleased. He could levy his own army,form his own admin-
istration,use his own financial organization under his own 
Minister of Finance. In short for all administrative pur-
poses the Soudan was 8undered from ~gypt. The Khedive in ,a 
letter to Gordon sending him certain information concern-
ing the centers of slave trade,assures him that ~gypt 
would loyally cooperate with him and urges him to use all 
--'-----------------------------------------------------------------.--~------
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the powers he had given him;to take all steps he thought 
necessary;and to punish,change,and dismiss all oticials he 
saw fit. Gordon followed the polic~ of going about the 
Soudan inspecting every thing. He would come in on some une 
8uspecting officials in the midst at their corrupt doings . 
and then without a question would dismiss them and send 
them back to Egypt replacing them with men whom he knew he 
could trust. He would strike off into the southern Kordofan 
region,with a bodyguard of a couple of hundred of men,and 
mee ting some slave traders wi th their capti ve.S would throw 
them into captivity,send them to the nearest wprison and 
liberating the enslaved blacks would send them back to the 
native tribes rejoj cing. By such methods he checked this 
terrible traffic in human flesh, and completely reorganized 
the administration in the Soudan. In 1879,when Ismail Pasha 
was deposed, pressure was brought to bear upon the new 
Egyptian Goverrunent,chiefly by the great number ot official 
whom Gordon had dismissed, and Gordon was recalled from the 
~oudan. 
The reins of administration were left in the hands 
of Raouf Pssha,a Turk. He was a man of purely oriental 
ideas and methods yet possessing an honest desire for 
justioe a8 'he saw it. He sad as his chief subordinates 
t hree Europeans. ~in Bey,a German,whom Gordon had placed 
in charge of the prOvinces of the equator,was retained in 
that position by Raout Pasha. Lupton Bey,an Englishman,was 
p~aced in command of the Bahr-.l-Ghazal province. And 
Slatin Bey,an Austrian,was placed in command ot the prov-
ince ot Darfur.lt was the efforts ot these men that kept · 
down the many small revolts which were continually rising 
during the next two years. With the advent of Egyptian 
officials,however,corruption again set in. Taxas became 
burdensome and in many cases were collected by force. All 
this tended to greatly increase the discontent,on the part 
of the ~oudanese ,with Egyptian control and they were ready 
to a ccept the 8lightest pretext to throw it off. The Arab 
81ave traders,angered by the check that had been placed 
upon their business by Gordon,opened up the old traffic 
with renewed vigor,determined to resiet by force any new 
attempts at suppression. Conditions grew rppidly worse. The 
administration became more and more unbearable. The tend-
encies toward a general revolt grew stronger and stronger 
until ,in 188I,they found expression in the Mahdist upris-
ing which not only swept Egyptian control out of the Soudan 
and threatened the existance of Egypt itself,but looked for __ .______ ,_,...... _______ t~_ ..... _=.~ 
a time as though it ' might develope into another great 
Mohammedan movement. 
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As prophesied by Mohemet and told by the ~~~n, 
ther was to come in after years to rule over 1sl~hO was 
to reform and purify the faith and establish the true re-
l~gion throughout the world. This prophet would be known , 
as the Mahdi,or the Heavenly guided one. This had been the 
theme and the idea upon whioh more than one Arab relegious 
fanatic had endeavored to gain pOW Gr since the relapse in 
trle Islam craze, but Wi~hout success. It was this same idea, 
coupled with a fanatic~desire for power,which,in the latter 
part of the sixties,took possession of a certain Soudanese 
of low birth,Mohammed Ahmed by name,a native of Dongola. 
He had,in 1860 and 186I,served under Dr~eney,a French 
Surgeon-Genersl,in the hospital service in the Soudan. It 
was in this service that he learnea the many lit t le tricks 
or chemistry and medicine which he brought into such power-
rul use,in his later career,as miracles. After leaving this 
eervice he became imbued with relegious fever and was ad-
mitted to the powerful relegious order of Ghelani Dervishes. 
He took to the lite of a hermit and/by 1870,had become 
generally known for his piety. About this time he estab-
ished himself at the island of Abba,in the White Nile about 
one hundred and thirty miles above Khartoum. Here he lived 
an ideal and exemplary life and besought all Islam to join 
him in renouncing this world amd living only for the world 
to come. His influence and notariety grew greater year by 
year. He gathered about him great numbers of Soudanese 
fanatics and established over them a control that was ab-
solute. His island became a shrine,a second Mecca;an object 
of pilgrimage for all true Moseelmen. Thus it went on ror 
about ten years until,in Ia8I,he began to put his well laid 
plans into execution./.He ~irst had himself publicly pro-
claimed as the Mahdi. And then invited all relegious fakirs 
and leaders to seek his influence and join him in a con-
quest ror 1slamism. He ' had chosen his time wi tll a skill 
that ~ to be admired. Conditions were ripe for just such 
a movement.The Soudanese,writhing under the Egyptian yoke, 
were anxious for any pretext for a revolt. This gave them 
the very chance they longed for. They could follow the 
Mahd1 with a good grace, they WOUld . be fighting for their 
fai th. 1 ..,
'Raouf Pasha suddenly dec~ded that th~s fanat~cal 
movement had gone far enough • .l).He dispatched an expedition 
from Khartoum' to capture the sO oalled Mahdi and disperse 
his followers. This expedition was met by a force led by ____ . ______ ~ ____________________ ~ ___ . ___ b__________________ , ________ 
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the inf'uriated Mahdi swwrd in hand,and almost completel~' 
distroyed;only a few escaping to carry the news back to 
Khartoum. This victory added greatly to the prestiege of 
the Mahdi. It designated him as the true conqueror. It was 
the one thing necessary to inspire in the mind of every 
Soudanese the belief that he was i~deed their Mahdi,and to 
bring th m 1'locking to his support. Immediately after this 
victory,in August 188I,the Mahdi retired with his followers 
imto the hills of southern Kordofan. Here he gathered about 
him a great number of the Arab tribes chief among which was 
the tribe of Baggars ,or cattle owning,Arabs. These later ' 
t'ormed the main stay of his fighting force. 
Revolution was no longer imminent,it was a reality 
and preparations were begun at once to suppress it.Reschid 
Bey,at . this time Governor of Fashoda,resolved to attack .. 
the Mahdi before he became more powert'ul. Early in December 
of I881,he left Fashoda with fifteen hundred men to disperse 
th Mahdists.1.8n December 9th,his force was overwhelmed by 
the followers of the Mahdi and almost annihilated. The news 
or this victory spread rapidly throughout the Soudan. The 
Mahdi now again issued a call to Islam to join him in a war 
against the infidelsjpromising his followers four t'it'ths of 
all the booty taken in war and insuring to all who fell 
righting for God and the true relegion the fullest enjoy-
ment of the pleasures of Par.aise. 
In the spring of the next year,I882,another attempt 
was made to dislodge the Mahd1.~Yuset' Pasha,with about five 
thousand regular Egyptian troops,left Khartoum,March I5,and 
marched .estVTard toward El-Obeid in Kordofan. However plans 
were change. and the expedition proceeded south to Fashoda, 
which was reached about the middle of May. After a short 
r .es t the expedi tion started west to f'ind and ciiestroy the 
Mahdi. On the evening of' June 6,they camped at Mesat,near 
the hill ot Gedir,confldent of' success. On the morning of 
June 7,in the early dawn the Mahdist host fell upon them ~ 
and completely annihilated the force. Scarcely a man was 
left alive and none escaped. The effect of this victory on 
the superstitous minds of the Soudanese can be readily 
und erstood. For over sixty years the country had been gov-
erned by the Egyptians '. I t' a tribe refused to pay ita taxes 
it But'fered punishment. No one had dared to question for a 
moment the power or course ot' the authorities. Suddenly J 
thie holy man had appeared upon the sceneand with a crow~d 
ot' halt' naked, ill ar.med,and undisciplined men he inflicted 
crushing defeats upon the well ar.med and well disciplined 
Gover;gm~nt trqQ The, Soud~n~se .. noj; only believed in him 
I. "Fire and Sword in the Soudan":by Slatin Pasha. pp.62. 
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t hey worshiped h im. They gathered about his standard in vast 
numb rs eager for fight. Under the cloak of a relegious war 
t hey coul d give vent to their ruling passions,to massacre, 
plunder a nd rob, and at the same time shake themselves free 
from taxa tion imposed upon them bY .R detested Goverrunent. 
~very day t he Mahdi would address them exhorting them again 
and again t o l ead exemplary lives and think only of the 
world t o come . With the blessings of paradise ever before 
them death wa s a pleasure,a thing to be sought for. Fear 
was absolut ely unknown to them. With "this kind of followers 
the Mahdi began h i s conquest of the Soudan. His first de-
finite move wa s to capture EI-Obeid the capital city or 
Kordofan. ~l-Obi ed was invested,in September I882,and after 
a 8 ige of five months was surrendered to the Mahdist for-
C8S. Her e t he Mahdi made his headquarters and· devoted his. 
t ime t o pr eaching and exhorting his followers. The command 
o f his t r oops he left almost intirely in the hands of 
Abdullahi bi n Sayed Mohammed,one of his Khalifas. The Khal-
it 6 Yer e the three right hand men of the Mahdi who~~ended . 
to the adminis tration tor him. Khalifa Abdullahi,however, 
was the olosest to the Mahdi and held the position of com-
mander in chief Of the army. With El-Obeid captured the 
Mahdi was i n practical control of all western and southern 
~oudan. 
When it became known that ~l-ObeiQ was besieged 
~gypti n offi cial circles suddenly awakened to the possi-
bilites o f danger to 'Egypt. It became· very evident that the 
movem nt Dl'Ostbe checked by some means. Arabi Pasha had 
withdrawn many ot the ~gyp tian troops from the Soudan and 
what remained were 80 scattered that they coula aot hope to 
cope with the Mahdiet horde . It had been the policy of the 
'Englieh , that whatever contro) they exerted within 'Egypt itJ!!-
s It or wha t ever complications the force of circu~tances 
br ough t about t here, they would have nothing to do with 
affairs in t he Soudan. Conditions there had been left en-
tirely in the han4s of the Egyptians. Now however,when they 
were alone 1n the control of Egypt they sud.enly found 
~gypti.n control in the Soudan swept awa"the region ever-
run by a rans t i cal horde,and Egypt in danger. An expedition 
must be 8 nt to crush the rebellion;there was no other way 
to turn. Abandonment of the ~oudan would only be leaving 
it in the hands or a power which would be a continual men-
a~oe t o Egyptian safety. Accordingly preperations for ~n 
expedition were begun at once. A body of troops numberlng 
about el even thousand aere colleeted,composed mostly of the 
' _________________________ ,__ • 4_ ... ~_ .. ____ _ 
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soldiers of the de.eated army of Arabi Pasha,and placed 
under the comrnamd of General Hicks./.The expedition embarked 
rrom Ruez tor SuakiD in the latter part of D~cember 1882. 
I.anding there it pushed across ' the desert to ' Berber and 
after great hardships reached Khartoum on the ,th of March 
1883. On September 9,I883,after a shortrest,Hicks left :' , 
Khartoum, wi th abou t 8,200 men,and began the march towards ' 
EI-Obeid;but he never reached it. After having marched some 
two hundred miles with continual losses from thirst and 
d'seasethe Egyptian troops,on November 5,I883,were hemmed 
in among the Kasgi 1 pass es, near the town 0 f Shekan, wi t .hin 
torty miles of El-Obeid,and after three days fighting were 
overpowered by a force five or six times their numberand 
completely annihilated. The last desperate attempt to crush 
the Mahdi had ended in ax a catastrophe more terrible than 
any tha t had preceded it and "Egyptian rule in the Soudan " . 
was at an end. 
There remained but one thing for the Mahdi to ac-
complish before he was absolute master of the Soudan. He 
must capture Khartoum,still held by an Egyptian force. Now 
came aboth r call for Gordon. He was looked upon as the one 
man who might yet save the people of Khartoum. Through the 
int'luence of the 'English Government he Ylas prevailed upon , ~. 
to return and sailed from Londo. January I8,I884. He reacheJ 
Khartoum on the 18th of February and was welcomed by the 
people as their deliverer. Gordon had started out with the 
policy in vieW' 01' evacua.ting the Soudan.~is orders,to a 
which he had agreed when he left London,were to proceed to 
Khartoum and at once set about the evacuation and the sar. 
retreat of thtt population desiring to come away_ Aft,r he 
had reached Khartoum,however,he became deter.mined tdusm8sh 
the Mahdi by force 01' arms./) 
The Mahdi now orciiered a general movement upon Khart-
oum. A torce or Arabs,well in advance of the main body, 
attacked Khartoum' on March 16,I884,but were repulsed with 
oons1d rable loss. It now became evident that the plan or 
the Mahdi was to occupy all the territory arountii. Khartoum 
bef,ore attacking the ci ty itself. Gradually the Dervi8h.~ 
close in about Khartoum.Yet Gordon succeeded for some t1me 
in keeping open cormrunications wi th "Egypt. On April 18,1884 
Gordon telegraphed that he must have relief ' and that his 
supplies would last him about ~ive months. Plans were at 
once begun ror his relief and rescue. The Soudan was only 
thought 01' now as the trap that held Gordon. The English 
Goverrunent had sent him there and English public sentiment 
now demanded that it should get him out. The question of --,-.,;;.;;--..;....--------- - ~,..,.-.-......~.. ---. ......... _ .... "....... ~ 
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the rout e to be taken by the relief expedition woefully 
aelaye~ the undertaking of the projec~./.Ther& was a contin-
ual .a~cillation between' the Suakin-Berber route and the 
route up the Nile valley. Suddenly the news came to Cairo 
t hat the Dervishes had taken Berber and that 2,000 people 
had been murdered. With Berber in the hands of the Mahdi 
all connections with GOTaon were cut off. Yet still the 
officials in London jangled over the route to be taken. Four 
long months were spent in useless parleying but at last on 
the 18th of August it was officially anounced that the Nile 
route had been chosem. Preparations for the start were now 
pushed vigorously. General Lord Wolseley,who had so successJ 
fully put dOwn the rebellion of Arabi Pasha,was placed in 
command of the expedition. He knew that the rapids of the 
Ni le would be a great hinderance to large steamers. Accord-
ingly he adopted the plan of having a large number of whale 
boats made to carry his troops up the Nile,and of tnlisting 
a corps of Canadain voyageurs to pilot these boats up the 
rapi ds . In the minds of many this was a useles :-~waste of 
time aba mo~y as the Nile boats could be had more readily 
and would serve the purpose fully 'a s weIland that the 
native river men would kilow the rapins of' the Nile better 
than Canadians from the Red river district. Wolse18Y's 
plans however,were carried out. 
:J. 
Wolseley arrived in Egypt in the early part of 
Reptember and soon after the expedition left Cairo. October 
5th found the expedition at Wady HaIfa the frontier post of 
'Egypt. From here on they must fight for every foot of 
ground. Slowly the relief column pushed its way southward 
but all to slow. ~or rour months Gordon waitedjencouragling 
his half starved garrison to hold out by keeping ever befor~ 
them the prospect of resctle by the 'English. On January 26, · 
1885,the host of the Mahdi stor.med the works before Khar-
toum and after many hours o~ s&ver fighting carried the ~~ 
A grand rush was made for the Palace where Gordon was known 
to be. They found him standing at the head of the stairway. 
As the black warriors entered and came toward him he asked; 
"Where is JIour Master the Mahdi?" His answere was a spear 
thrust through the heart and he fell forward dead. Two @.ays 
latter Sir C.Wilson With two steamers loaded with men and 
provisions reached Khartoum only to find it in the hands 
of the Mahdi and Gordo~ no more. He turned about and put 
back to Metemmeh where he had left the main co}umn eight 
days before in a vain atte~t to reach Gordon in time. It 
was this move on the part of the British which had caused 
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the hdi to ort.r the rinal attack on Khartoum which ~._ 
8uIt. in its capture. 
ith Khartoum in his hands the MahQi could claim 
the ~oud.n a8 absOlutely his own and at once set about or-
g nizing hi government. He established a tyranRical ana 
xtortionate administration upon the most barbarous or . 
principle • He looated his capital on the site or Fort 
Omdunnan,on the west bank or the Nile across the river from 
Khartoum . Her he built up a great city or straw and mud 
huts, n unsanitary conditions. The results were that · very 
shortly plague ot small pox broke out to which ,on June 
2I , I8S8 ,th Wah i himslef tell a victim. His last command 
to hi. followera was that they should faithfully follow and 
obey the Khalit. Abdullahi,who was henceforth to be their 
leder. Th Khalit. carried on afrairs along the lines es-
tab11h d by the Mahd1 holaing complete · sway in the Soudan 
with Donsol s the chiet northern post. The region between 
Dongola nd · dy HaIfa· being the frontier. His rule was 
exceec.11ngly tyrannical. Ruin and devastation marked the 
r giona once the homes of the tribes which had darea to 
oppo • hi. yill;while those who submitted to him were 
robb d t every turn under the pretext of taxation. He main-
t in d n immense army with which to inforce his will and 
xt nd hi conquest ; to pay for which methods of extortion. 
were fre ly used to gain revenue. 
Aft r the olseley expedition had failed in the 
ttempt to rescue Gordon many plans were put forward for 
the reo ptur of Khartoum . None of them ,however,wefe ever 
un rtk n. In the early days of 1886 the troops along the 
11e w r withdrawn to Wady HaIfa and the Soudan was aban-
on • . gypt was oompletely cut orf from any conmercial or 
politic 1 reI tion with the Soudan and the Khalifa's war-
riors continually harr assed the frontiers of Egypt. There 
wlmo t oontinuel fighting around ~uakin which remained 
1n ~gyptl n h nda ,and which the Khalifa was very anxious 
to c pture 8 1t furnish the Roudan with an excellent port 
t'orooam rc 1 . 1 oOlJlJ1Unica tion with the outside world. It was 
to prevent this very thing that' the Anglo-Egyptian Govern-
ment h 1 80 doggedly to Suakin. Yet to hold Suakin was all 
th t ." e tte ptedany thought of reconquest being for the 
time opposed by the British. ~ngland had thrown away a 
gr t 1 ot money and many valuable lives on the Soudan 
nd 14 not car. to continue such a ,oliey. Furthermore as 
she no h 1 801. influence in Egyptian affairs, the questin 
or what to do with Rgypt was demanding all of her atteneion. ------- --- »* 
alit _ 
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The attitu~e of England toward Egypt was very un-
settled. ~h could Rot directly annex it as the rest of ~ .. 
Rurope would not look favorably upon such a policy. Neither 
could she proclaim a protectorate over it as she was not 
8ure that she desired to remain in "Egypt. Lord Gre.:m.ville ,on 
Janua~ 3,I883,ia a note adressed to the Powers,haa laid 
do n the policy weich Englaad intended to follow regarding 
"Egypt I as follows : '" Al though tor the present a Bri tish force 
remains in Egypt tor the preservation of public tranquility, 
Her Majesty's Government are desi~eouB of withdrawiRg it as 
soon a8 the stat. of the country and the organization of 
proper mans tor the maintenance ot the Khedive's authority 
will admit of it. In the meantime the position i8 which Her 
Uai sty's Government are placed toward His Highness imposes 
upon them th~A.duty ot giving :to aflvice wi th the objec.t . ot: 
seouring thatAorder of things to be established shall have 
a satisfaotory eharacter,ana possess the elements of sta-
bility and progress." 
The object of Eagland then,was the establishment ot 
an order or things possessing the elements or stability and 
progr ss. This objeot was to be obtained by giving advice. 
Lord Gr nv111e,in a note to Sir ~velyn Baring the British 
Consul-General at Oairo,gives a vtJry clear and. d.efinat. in-
t rpret"\,tio!l of 'What he meant by the phrase "giving advice'! 
H. saY8;"I hardly need to ' point out that in important quee-
tlone,where the administration and safety of Egypt are at 
stake,it 1s indespensible that Her Matesty's Govermment 
ehould,eo long as the proYisional occupation ot the country 
by th ~nili8h troops continues,be assured that the aavie. 
whieh,atter rull consiaeration of the views of the Egy~tran 
Gov rhment,they may reel it their auty to tenEier to the 
Kh iv ,shOUld be rOllowed. It should be made . clear to the 
Egyptian .ln1aters and the Governors of the p.rovinces,that 
the respons1bili ty jwhieh for the time rest.s on .England, 
obligee Her Majesty's Government to insist upon the aaoptio n 
of the policy which they reoommend,and that it wi1l be nec-
s8ary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow 
this oourse should oease to hold their offices." 
Thus with her policy fairly plain and the method by 
which it was to be carried out much plainer England set 
about reforming Egypt. She wanted to teach Egypt to take 
oare of herel ' r. Yet it seemed at first that the harier she 
work d the les 8 Egypt would learn. ~or the first rive years 
it se med that all efforts were in vain. Everything went 
wrong. The debt would not aecrease while the revenue of the 
.. ...--.- ------ - -
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country was steadily falling off,making the interest obli-
gations harder and harder to meet. The international fetters 
which had so hampered "Egypt before the rebellion of 1882 
now fell upon 'EnglanG.;and were made tighter and more incon-
venient by the jealousy of France. That country never lost 
a chance to complain against a move or a policy where there 
was the least pretext whatever for dOing so. The Egyptian 
officials could not be brought to understand that advice 
when given was expected to be followed. O:aly when the adviee 
was firmly backed by the statement that the English Govern-
ment would' stand no more trifling in the matter,was it 
acted upon. Only when it took the form of .an order could 
the "Egyptian ot'fieials clearly unders .tand tha tit was::'. to 
be carrieQ out. Gradually,however,the English came to under 
stand how to manage the ~gyptians and the cloud of gloom 
which had hung over condi tions in Egypt begaa to lift. . 
The tellah,as the Egyptian peasant is dall.d,flnally 
began to appreciate that he was being benifited by the 
influence of England. At fir8t he had been discontented. But 
when he saw the irrigation conaitions of his country being 
improved an4 regulated so that the Nile flooa could be con-
trolecl and the li:r. giving waters 80 distributed that his . 
crope,t"orm y'ar to year and in all parts o~ his country, 
were assured; When he :round himslef no longer flogged into 
paying his taxesjhis taxes considerably lightened and the ~ 
time fo~_paying thOse taxes fixed at a period o:r the. year 
when ha'~old his crops and had money on hand with. which 
to pay t~em:When he found that if he had a grievance. against 
another fellah or against an of:ricial he could go imto the 
courts with perfect confidence that he would receive jus-
tice: then it began to dawn upon him that perhaps the in-
fluence of Englana was a good thing after all .ana he was . 
grateful. Thus after thirteen years of hard work. and deter-
min.a efforts on the part!' of "Englan4,Egypt came to see that 
she could not do without the English advice. 
One or the chi.f fields of inl1uence,and perhaps 
the one that showed the most steady advance,was the anmy. 
When Arabi Pasha was overthrown,in 1882,and his army dis-
band ed the question arose as to what would take the place 
of the 'Egyptian army aS l 11;he arm of nation.al defense. It was 
thought that England would not attempt again to make a sol-
dier of the Rgyptian fellah, for he had been proved time 
after time to be a failure. Suggestions as to what course 
to follow came trom every hand. Some ' thought that Turkish 
battalions should be placed in Egypt. Others thought that 
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a better plan Woula be to have mixei European battalions,or 
better still perhaps the employment of Sepoy battalions 
rrom India. The English Government,however,adhere. firmly 
to the prinCiple that the de~ense of Egypt should be in-
trust ed to its own inhabitants. Foreigners as eiviliansin 
Egypt had been a never ceasing annoyance,and the .roubles 
with them served as ' a warning against the placing of for-
e ign solaiers there. The plans of the ~nglish Government , 
were incomparably the best if they could. be carried out ana. 
it soon became evident that the best and surest means of 
oarrying them out was to place English officers over Egypt-
ian soldiers. The Khedive was prevaileci upon to appoint as · 
Sirdar,or 60mmander in Chief,or the ~gyptian army the well 
known English officer,~ir Evelyn Wood. Twenty-six other 
~ngli8h o~fic.rs were appointed to aia the Slraar ift organ-
izing and drillijg the new Egyptian army. The progress made 
by these men was slow but, steady. By living examples of the 
powers ~1 o~ courage and daring, and by constant drilling 
they raised a class of men. whose mame .had once been sym-
bolic o~ cowardice to an unquestio.ne.Gi JluxUil:xum: posi tion 
among the best soldiers or the world. After 1887 whem the 
majority of English troops were withdrawn from Egypt it was 
~ound neces8arp to increase the ~gyptian army in numbers. 
In 1884,a regiment of Sou«anese b1ac~s wefe enlisted and 
had on several ocoasions proved a very valuable adjunct to 
the ~gyptian fighting force. The experment of enlistisg 
thes blacks had been such a success that it was now deeide4 
to make t h e increase of the army of this material. By the 
e10s9 of 1888 four new regiments had been enlisted which in 
the later campaign' proved to be among the most reliable 
forces ot the army. 
The n.w army had many chances o~ seeing active ser-
vioe. Divisions haa to be continually stationed at Wady 
HaIfa and Suakin to ~ight off the raiaing Dervishes. Suakin 
had never fallen into the han4s of the Khalifa although 
time aft e r time he attempteito take it. In this region the 
~nglish used successfully the friendship of Xing 30hn or 
Abyssinia,whose armies did much o~ the fighting.I.Egypt had, 
on February 6,1885, turned Massawa,a port on the RED Sea 
south o~ Suakin,over to the Italians who also took an act-
ive part in many of the struggles against the Dervishes in 
this district. It was the united efforts o~ Eng11sh,Italian~ 
and AbY8 81nians that prevented the Dervishes trom reaching 
the Red SeR. Gra~ual1y the Dervish leaders lost influence 
with the tribes in the .e~th andnortheast and were compelleJ 
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to fall back toward Khartoum. By the summer of 1891 trade ... ; 
was reope~ed between ~uakin and Berber./ln July 1894,the 
Italians 8uprised the Dervish force at Kassala ana captured 
the plao • The Khalifa ordered his chief General,Osman 
Digna to retake it but the Italians . successfully held it . . 
The begining ot the year 1896 found "England. with : ·' 
Egyptian aftairs 80 well in hand. ana conditions in Egypt 
suffiei ntly sound that when a request . came from the Ital-
ian Government that a demonstration be made,by the Egyptian 
troops, beyond Wady HaIfa in order to relieve the Dervish . 
pressure upon Kassala,there was not the least hesitancy in 
complying. The demonstration as originally proposea was in-
8ignirl~_nt. But once set on foot it quickly turned into a . 
proJeot tor the reqonquest of the Soudan. When in 1885,the 
Soudan was abandoned it was manifest that some day,when she 
had recup rated her strenght ana collected her resources, 
Egypt would reassert her control over the vast region sur-
rounding the upper courses ot the Nile. That time had now 
arriv d,but it had come so unexpectedly that all the re-
sources of ~gypt were called into play to support it. The 
succeS8 ot England's eftorts to reform Egypt were suddenly 
put to the test, but they stood the shock well. 
The oampaign for the recapture or Khartoum was 
author1zd in the spri~g ot 1896. The entire management was 
placed in the hanas of~Sir Herbert Kitchener the Sirdar of 
of the Egyptian army. It is to the great energy and organ-
izing genius of this man that the extraordinary efficiency 
of the ~gyptlan and Soudanese troops)which eame out sO di8~ 
tinotly in thi8 campaign,is due. His plan for the campaign. 
was first to clear the province of Dongola of the D1rvishes 
and then go on to Khartoum. The end of the year 1896 saw .. 
the first step in the campaign successfully completed. Then 
the troops were given a short rest tor the winter. The R1r-
dar well kn w that if the campaign was. successrul it .eant 
not 80 much a victory Over Dervishes as it di~ a victory 
over distance and climatic conditions. He decided that the 
position at Dongola was to exposed to use as a base of sup-
plies,and that a direct route across the desert from Wady 
HaIfa to some pOint,8uch as Abu Hamed,was the more pract-
ioal as it cut otf the great Dongola bend of the Nile. This 
would shorten the route over which supplies must be carried 
by many hundred miles. But to boldly etrike out into the 
desert,with a large army,where supplies even water must be 
brought great distances,was a very 8erious proposition. un-
lees there was a sure and rapid means of communication con-
tinually maintained with some large base of supplies. The 
I. Handbook ot the ~oudan tor 1898. 
I Horatio Herbert Kitehener was born Sept.22,I850,at Guns-
borough Villa,near Ballylongfordf Kerry,1reland.He was 
educated at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich,~ng. 
Rntered the army as Lieutenant of Royal Engineers in 
'· 'I871.From 1871-74 he partiCipated in the Franco-Pruss~an 
war under French colors. From 1874-82 he was engaged ln 
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Rlrdar therefore determine" to build a rail.oad as he advan-
c.~ a.cross this great s.tretch of Eiesert 80 that when he 
again reached the Nile therewoula be all that could be asked 
tor in the way of transportation fecilities. 
The spr~ng of 1897 saw the railway begun from Wady 
HaIfa out into the desert. Abu Hamed,where it was expected 
to again reach the Nile,was in the hand s of the Dervishes 
who must be driven out before the project could be suceess-
fully completed. This task was assigned to Major-General . 
lIunter who,after a march of one hundred ana thirty-two 
miles across the desert,attacked ani captured Abu Hamed,on 
August 7,I897,with the loss of only One hundred men. This 
victory had an unexpected result. The D~rvishes immediately 
evacuated Berber,their strongest post between Abu Hamed and 
Khartoum,and withdrew to the neighborhood of Omdurman. 
General Hunter at Once pushed on to Berber and took poss-
ession of that post. The railroad was then hurried forward 
and by the end of the year,I897,troops ana supplies could 
be carried straight from Wady Halfa to Berber. 
After a short rest at bBerber the forward movement 
towards Khartoum was begun again. Fort Atbara,at the junct_ 
ion of the river Atbara' and the Nile)was occupied and then . 
came another short halt. Because o~ the near approach to ' 
the Dervish capital it was thought .best to call up some 'En~­
lish troops in order be strengthen the force. By the spring 
of 1898 they had arrived and preparations ror the advaNce 
were begun. However,just at thie time came the news that 
Osman Digna,the Khalifats chief general,with a f~rc. or abuut 
20,000 Dervishes,had started north to recapture ierber.Then 
came the rumor that he had gone eastward to the Atbara and 
was advancing down that stream. After several aays of anx-
ious scouting it was discovered that Osman Digna had con- · 
structed a fortified camp on the Atbara about seventeen 
miles ~rom its junction with the Nile. Here he evidently 
intenaed to await an attack and he Qia not wait in vain. 
After having definately located the camp or the Dervishes 
the Sirdar determined to attack at once. On April 6,1898,a 
rorce of 12,000 men under the personal command of the Sirda~ 
started up the Atbars. On the following day,April 7,they 
attacked the camp of the Dervishes dereating them with a 
loss of 3,000 men. The ~1rdar lost about 500men. After in-
flicting this defeat upon the Dervishes the Sirdar returned 
to Fort Atbara and after a short period of preperation the 
final advance upon Omdurman began. 
survey work and civil organization of Palestine and Cyprus 
with a brief interval of residence at ~rgerum,as Vice-Consul 
of Anatolia from 1879-80. In 1882 Sir Evelyn Wood, the new ( 
~irdar or the Egyptian army,apPointed ~im,as volinteer,to 
one ot the two majorships of the ~gyptlan caval~. He par-
ticipated in the Wolseley expeditlon fer the rellef of 
Gordon_From 1886-88 he was Governor of Suakin. After the 
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As the Nile began to rise/twenty-two thousand men 
began to move steadly southward toward Omdurman. The might _ 
of' ~eptember I,I898,found them drawn up in line or battle 
behind semi-circular intrenchments at the little village of 
Agaiga about seven miles f'rom Omdurman. Ear~y on the morn-
iDg of' September 2,the Bervishes,in vast numbers, advanced 
to a ttaek the 'Egyptian camp. Time after time they charged . . 
the position held by the Sirdar's forces but the rellah,the 
black ~oudanese,and the Englishs soldiers stood firm. Sharp 
nel,Maxim,and Lee-Motford mowed down the Dervishes long be-
rore they came within stricking distance. Over thirty thou~ 
sands of dead bodies marked the scene 'of their Cilesperate . 
charges. On the evening of september 2,the 8irdar took poss-
ession of Omdurmall without resistance for the Khalifa had 
1"led)makimg his escape into Kordofan. Two tiiays later the 
Union Jack and the cresented stamdard of Egypt were raised 
above the ruins of Goraonts palace at Khartoum and the 
~ou4an was virtually in the hands of Egypt. To 8ay,however~ 
that it was im the hands of ~gypt is merely an i.direct way 
of saying that it was in the hancis of England. 
. e Sirdar at OBce set about establishi~g a mili-
tary hold upon the Soudan. Gradu.ally he pushed out to the 
"est and south from Khartoum destroying all. opposition. from 
emaller bands of Dervishes and strengthening his positions 
tor the final struggle with the Xhalifa. On . December 26,I89~ 
Oolonel Lewis attaeked and «efeatea a Dervish force under 
Emir Ahmed Fedil,while it was attempting to cross the Blue 
Nile t the cataract near Roseires,about four hunare. miles 
south ot Khartoum. ~ir Fedil was the last of the Kbalirats 
Ii utenants to hold the field with an organizea. body or 
Dervishes. His tore. had not been in the battle of Omdurman 
and he was endeavoring to join the Khalifa " when defeated by 
Colonel Lewis. The only remainiug body of tiervishes which 
cou14 have now made any trouble was that in Kordofan unmer 
the direet command of the Khalifa. After the battle ot 
Omdurman the Khalifa,with his remaining followers,retired 
toward ~-Obeid,in Kordofan,where he previously collected 
much treasure and large stores 01' grain and ammunition.Here 
he attempted to restore his hold upon the Soudanese by pro-
claiming that the battle of Omaurman had fulfilled the pro ... 
phesy,that all waverers in Mahdism would be weeded out in a 
battle with the infidels. And that the 8urvivers,being the 
true believers,would rally at the island of Abba,the birth 
place 01" Mahdism,and drive the infidels before them. He re-
mained in the neighborhood of El-Obeid for some months and . 
conclusion of the ISstern Soudan campaign in 1889,he was 
engaged for four years as Adjutant-General and second in 
command of the 'Egyptian armyjalso as Inspector-General of 
police. In 1892 he was appointed ~irdar of the .. Egyptian 
army. From 1894-96 he was nlaking prepera tions for the re-
Conquest of the Soudan and t'orm I896-99 waseonducting the 
campaign which reslll ted in the capture or Omdurma,n, Sept .2~,. 
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then began a northward movement apparently toward Khartoum. 
The ~ird r,however,did not believe that the Khalifa was 
greatly to be feared and for a time suspended operations 
looking to his capture in order to give his attention to, 
the civil questions opened up by the occupation of the 
~oudan . 
The English Government was as much at sea,regarding 
the policy to be followed in the Soudan,a~ it had been in 
the oaS8 or Egypt./nuring the session or ~arliament of 1897 
and 1898 Rir Michael Hicks-Beach had declare« that the Eng-
lish Governm nt had no intention of proceeding beyond Khar~ 
toum or of retaining British troops in the SouQan)after the 
immediate object ot the expedition had been achieved. How-
verJafter the battle of Omdurman the Roudan was declared 
to be un~er martial law,awaiting the decision of England and 
19ypt ae ~the form of administration to be established there. 
Early in January,I899,Lord Cromer,English Consul-General in 
Egypt,l id own the ·principles on which the Soudan was to 
be governed/ and on January I9,an agreement confir.ming the 
tollo 1~g system of administration,was signed at Cairo. 
The gov rrunent of the Soudan was to be by the t1le.n 
or England and the Khedive of Egypt. The representative of 
both yas to be the Sirder.The ~nglish and the Egyptian flags 
were both to be used on land and water throughout the Sou-
d n,exc pt in the town of Suakin where the Egyptian. flag . 
alone yas to be usee.Ofte officer alone was to have supreme 
military and civil command. He was to be termed Governor-
General or the Soudan and was to be appointed by· Khedivial 
de~e. with the assent or the ~ngli8h Government. Laws, 
orders, nd regulations for good government of the Soudan, 
nd for holding,deoposing,or devolution of property could 
be made,altered ,or abrogated by the proclatmation of the 
Governor-General ,who was to Rotify the British agent in 
C iro and the Pres1dant of the Councilor Ministers. All 
lawa,or ers,and regulations 80 issued could apply either 
to the Thole or to any part of the Soudan,and could alter 
or repeal any existing law either by explicit statement or 
by implication . No law,enacted after the adoption of this 
plan,could apply to the Soudan without permission of the 
Governor-General. No special privilege should be given to 
anyone nationality in regard to trading or holding proper;y 
in the Soudan. Import duties were not payable On goods rrom 
Egypt,but oould be levied on goods entering the Soudan 
through Suak1n or other ports on the Red Sea. Duties on 
goods leaving the Soudan were to be perscribed from time to 
I. Quarterly Review,Oct.I899. pp.567. 
2. Rtatesman's Year Book,1899-1900. 
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1898. For this service he was created Baron Kitchener or 
Khartoum and of Aspsll (Suffolk). In 1899 he became Gov-
ernor-General of the Soudan. In 1900 he was called to .Routh 
Africa to t ake conmand of the English forces :ngaged 1n the 
Boer war .. He successfully conducteo. the campa1gn and forced 
32. 
time by proclamation. The mixed tribunals of Egypt were to 
have no jurisdiction' in the Soudan,which is under martial 
law,except in Suakin. No consuls or consular agents were to 
be allowei to reside in the Soudan without the consent of 
the 'English Government. The importation of slaves was ,. pro-
hibited. And the treaty,known as the Brussels act o~ July 2, 
1890,ror the suppression of the slave traffic,was to be 
inforced with especial attantion to the articles relative 
to the importation and 8&le of liquors and firear.ms. The 
Soudan was defined as encluding all territories south of 
twenty-two degrees north latitude which had never been 
evacuated by the ~gyptian garrisons,and those pro~inces 
whioh were administered by the Government of the Kheaive 
previous to the Mahdist rebellion and which were then tem-
por1arly lost to Egypt,and had since been reconquereQ by ta~ 
two Governments acting together,or which might be recon- , 
quered in the future. This region was .'vided,ror admimistra-
tiY. purposes,into four first class districts,Omdurman, 
Sennar,Kassala,and Fashoda; and three second class Qistrict~ 
Assuan,Wady Halfa,and Suakin. Rix military Governors were 
at onee appointed. 
About a month after the battle of Roseires Kitchene~ 
who was now Governor-General of the Souian,began a recomB 
naissance south from ,Khartoum in order to locate the 
Khalif •• At Dueim he found the Dervishes strongly encamped 
but .terre attack beeause or lack of numbers. A little 
later he compelled the Dervishes to retire and made Dueim 
the a vanee post of the Anglo-~gyptian forces. He then je-
t ~ined to strengthen his hold' in this region before at- . 
tempting to capture the Khalifa. By October he had so ta'r 
8uoce ded in this that he ,began very active operations to 
raw the Khalif. iBto battle. The Khalira however drew off 
to the north and was not heard of again until November when 
he was located near Gedicl. The Sirdar deciflea to catch him 
there if possible. Accordingly on November 2I,1899,Colonel 
Wingat ,with about 3,700 men,was dispatched on this mission 
At Abo Ab11,on November 22,the Khalifa's advance guard of 
about 2,500 men,was met and defeated. Wingate at once pushed 
on to Gedid in order to cut off the Khalifa's retreat. Ariv-
ing there,on November 23,he locate a the Dervish camp at 
Om Debrekat,about six miles away. During the night of Nov-
mber 23,Wingate occupied a ridge overlooking this e~p and 
on the following morning,completely defeated them in a 
battle in which the Khalifa was killed and the Dervish 
power utterly broken • 
.. -------,-_____________________ ...... ~,," ........... _......_. .. '1 1IIIfV_~~~ • .--
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the acceptance of peace by the Boers OR May 31,1902. Fo~ 
this service he was created Viscount of Khartoum, the Vaa~ 
and Aspall (Suffolk). In 1902 he was appointea Commander 
in Chief or the army of India. It was his suggestion whieh 
set on toot the movement for the establishment of Gordon 
College at Khartoum. 
• 
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All oPPosition to Anglo-Egyptian rule being now 
destroY ed pr eper a tions wer, rapidly pushed for opening the 
Soudan to t he world and On 'December 12,I899,after having 
been pract i cally closed tor a period of sixteen years, the 
Soudan was decla red open to traffic.The railroad had,on 
December 31, 1899,reached Halfaya on tha banks of the Blue 
Nile oppos ite Khartoum. It was therefore possible to go 
from Cai ro direct to Khartoum by rail. By the end of 1899 
we find the Soudan under complete military control of the 
Anglo-Egyptian forces. The basis of a new administration 
had been f ormed' and every thing was in readiness for the 
work of r evival. The futur e of the Soudan was to depana 
mainly upon good administration, the increase and enlight-
enment of the population, the improvement of its communica-
t 1ons , and t he developement of i'ts agricultural possibl.liti «tJ 
When in the latter part of I899,Lord Kitchener. was 
call ed t o Sou th Africa,Sir Reginald Wingate succeeded him as 
Si r der of the a rmy and Governor~General of the Soudan. Al-
though the Governor-General is Sirdar and many oa his prin-
cipal subordina t es are military officers the administration 
18 essentially civil. A district is now termed a Moudiri eh, 
and the Governor is called the Moudir. The Governors . are 
mi litary officers holding active commissions in th~ anooy, 
a nd a r e in command of the forces of the district. They are 
compelled to make a periodical report,to the Governor-
Gener al ,on the comdition of their district.~In 1900 the 
offi c of I nsp ctor-General was created. It is the duty of 
this offic er to go about through the Soudan noting the pro-
gress o f a ll branches of public works and su~gesting such 
new r eforms a s he may deem necessary or profltable.'l.Sir 
Rudolph von ~la tin,who was Governor of Darfour before the 
Mah 1st reb ll i onand who was . a captive in the hands or the 
Dervishes for ' nearly ten years,was appointea to this impor-
t an t posit i on . His long experienc e in the country and his 
thorough knowl edge of its inhabitants designating him as 
t he one man to fill such a position. 
Rxt ending south from the Egyptian frontier to lake 
Al bert N' Yanza ,I400 miles,and west fro. the Red Sea to the 
contin s of Wadi in central Africa (although the western 
boundary i s undefine i ) the present Soudan has an area of 
950 000 s quare miles. The chief towns are Khartoum,Omdurma~J 
WadY Halfa , New Do~ola,El-Obeid,Sennar,Kas8ala,an4 Suakin. 
Sinc e 1899 the Soudan has . been redistricted. 3The report on 
t he Soudan tor 1903 gives nine first class districts,DarTur 
(or Darf our),Khartoum,Ghezireh {between the Blue and White 
I. Rt a t esman's Year Book,I900. pp.II40. 
2. " "" 1901." " 
3. Report on the conditions in' Egypt and the Soudan. 
(Blue Book---Egypt. No.1. 1904.) 
4 . (A short biography of Slatin will be found on page 31) 
# Francis Reginald Wingate was born at Broadfield,Renfrew-
s hire , and educated at the Royal Military Academy, at 
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Nil.s},Berber,~ennar,Kassala,The Upper Nile Province (the 
old pr?vimceof Fashoda),Koraofan,and Bhar-el-Ghazal. There 
are stlll three second class aistric .ts,Suakin,Dol'lgola,ancil . 
Wady Balta •. Law ana order once established in this region 
the new adUllnistration set . about redistributing .the popu-
latioll.,settling the frontiers,establishing communications, 
and increasing the revenues. Besides the land .. and date 
taxeswhich had been as tablished in 189.9, taxes were .. placed 
on houses in towns,on boats,and on heras. Twenty-five per 
cent was ' collected on gum arabic,ivory,tobacco,and ostrich 
teathers. License dues were required for earring firearms, 
selling liquors,and for selling in the markets. Progress, 
in the revival of the Souian,however, was very slow and the 
effects of the misgo.vernment under which it labordecii for so 
long a time are .still no1 icable in many of the districts. 
In spite of all attempts to raise re.venue the poverty ana 
depopulation of the country uj't,ltll:R so great that the bur-
deJn of administration bas been ana will,1'be, for ' some years . 
to come,a heavy drain on the Egyptian Treasury./.Por exrunple 
the accounts for 1902 show a deficit of247,OOO Egyptian 
pounds,and for I903 a a_ficit ot 156,OOO~~gyptian pounds. 
This deficit must be met by the Egyptian Treasury. As can 
be seeD the deficit is ~ecreas'ng from year to year and 
wou.lei in a. short time cease to exiet,8ut it has been the 
policy Or the administration to utilize the increase in re .. 
venue to provide .. for further expendi tures .which the Soudan . 
greatly needs. . .. 
The. success of any established governmwat will de-
pend largely upon the administration of justice. R.cogniz~ 
ing this the English have endeavored to establish im the . 
Soudan as complete a system of justice as possible. The 
present organization of the Courts is based upon the Civil 
Justio Ordinance of 1900 .•. .3.Uncler this Ordinanc. all civil . 
courts are subordinated to the Legal Secretaryf in his 
capacity as Acting Judicial Oommissioner. Criminal justice 
in each province is admini.sterecl by the Moudir's eO:urt, 
having general competence and composed of the Mouair,or his 
representatiYe,and two other Magistrates;by Minor District 
Court8 of three arfic.ers wi th limi ted competence ;and by 
Magistrates with yet more limited powers. These Magistrates 
are the members ot the Provincial Administrative Staff,who 
are either picked officers of the army or civilian inspect-
ora,who are requirea to pass examination in the Codes used , 
by the Courts in the administration of justice. Appeals lie 
to the Moudir or from the ' Court of the Moudir to that of 
the Judicial Commissioner. All sentences passed by the 
I. Report on the Soudan for 1903. (Blue Book---~gypt.No.I. 
1904. ) 
2. Am Egyptian pound equals about $4.943. 
3. Report on the Soudan for 1903. (Blue Book---Egypt.No.I. 
1904. ) 
Woolwich.Became Lieut. in Royal Artillery 18BO.Served in 
India and Aden 1881-83.Joined the Egyptian army in 1883. 
Al.d~de7Qr;lmp . . to. G~It" 9tr "Eyelyn. WO.on 1884 ~Q ..... TQo)t part 11) the 
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Court ot t he Moudir are sUbmitted to the Governor-General 
tor oonf1nooat1on . Those of the suordinat. courts are either 
submitted to the Moudir for contirmation or are open to app 
p al b tor him . Mohamedan Law Courts have been es tablished 
h1ch d a1 '1'1 t h all qUestions ilil conna.etlon wi th personal 
t . tus. In these cOJlrts justice 1sadministered by Mohamedan 
luds.e . Compl intS{however,are frequent that great difficul-
ty i ncount r d in finding competent men to act as judges 
18 th 8e courts . It ie expected that the apr ad of . educat-
ion will remedy this. . 
One ot the chi ef obstaoles im the way of successful 
developem n t in the Soud.an is the scarcity of population. 
Th r nev r has been a census taken in the Soudanand accord-
inSly ther e n b no pretense as to accuracy of figures. 
But tter oareful inve s tigation and considvration of esti-
mat th rollo.ing :figures have been c.ompiled. t ln 1881,at 
the outbrak ot th. Deryish rebellion,the approximate .pop-
ul tlon ot t he Soudan was 8,451,000. During the Dervish 
rule.! b oause ot tamine and des·eass,i t is estlma telll that 
5, 51 ,000 pople perish d . While 3,203,500 more are said to 
h v b en killed in battle,either in external or internal 
r , or to have been massacred,by ordar of the . Khalifa, .. 
b oau they r tused to obey his will. In one district,in ~ 
1882 ,ther 1s said to have been nearly eight hundred. vill-
ag 8 ,but wheD the I nspector-General passed through the d.is-
trict 1n 190I,not one village remained. The pre8ent popula~ 
tion ot th ~oudan 18 e8ti~ted at about 1,870,500 or _ 
G. 580 , 500 1es8 than the 8S tima te for 1881. Villa-ga 8 which 
tor r1y could produce five or six hundre4 fighting men now 
h ve only titty or sixty adult males • . It is easy to see 
th retort why th Administration in the Soudan so eagerly 
enoourage ilJllligratlon . In a region capable of supporting 
t n million or more or people,progress must necessarily be 
slow when therex1s t e soarcely more than one tenth of the 
inhabitant s nec Beary to develope the resources of the coun-
t~. . 
Ad to the above conditions the general disposition 
o t the . oudanes to avoid work and youJ~lha~~ ~h~ ~i tua tiC?fl 
in whloh the ~oudan Administration finds ~~~f 1tself 1n 
1 t ttempts to increase the resources of the country. The 
in 1epo ltion ot the Soudanes8 to work is only the natural 
r sulta ot heredi ty and environment. The mixture of Arab and 
Negro bloc ,whioh has produced the Soudanese type,would 
naturally re sult in an indolent race. The pure blood Arab 
800rna manual labor and the cultivation ot the soil,while ' 
the n roid t 8S at Atrica never aomore thanahe actual 
I. Report on the Soudan tor 1903. (Blue Book--Egypt.No.I. 
. 1904.) 
oamp igne about Suakin from 1885-96,acting as Govern?r of 
the Red R •• Littoral at !=iuakin during I894 •. H~ wa~ Dlrector 
or K111tary Intelligeno in the Dongola campa1gn 1n 1896, 
nd a m nbe r ot the special commission to King Menelek of 
Aby sin1a in 1897. He returned to participate in the exped-
1 tlon to the recapture . . ot. Ih.rtoum . Ia91~9E2 'h Waf;? in command 
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. ount ot' wor toro upon them by the necessities of life. 
The w ntor the Soudaneae are few and simple. They need 
80 ro ly any clothing and apparently hav'& no desire to im-
prov th 1r PO ltlon in lite. They live in a country where 
a bountt ou nnu 1 r inrall prac tieally aasures .the required 
tood supply. The oultivated 80il needs no prepartion to 
r .c 1 v th d an the 8e d once planted the ero,p needs ! . 
no turthur ttention until the time for harvest. The area 
which c n 'be turned to cul t1vation is immense and it will 
b ny Y. r e b t ore the densi ty of population renders the 
upply in uttlo1 nt . In the dis tricts north of Khartoum, . 
ho.. rtcon i tlon re somewhat different. Here the rain 
r 1 18 note bun4 nt nor as aure as in the south,ani the 
aur 
with 
uoh 
v 
ot th orops depends almost 'ntirely upon irrigation 
opl. 0 n only support th mselves by har« and con tin-
bor . A re ult theae have been the districts where 
pro p rlty have advanced most rapidly. In the 
rn 1 trlcte ,ho ever,it 18 not probable that the . 
n e w111 tak seriously to hard work until the pres-
ot an lor e 1n& population brlBgs them race to face 
th propos ition that th y must work or starve. For 
n lnor of popula tion the adm1nistration is using 
enoou ge nt . 
It 1 • i nt , howevor,that,becnase of the extreme ; 
unhe thtuln.88 ot'lthes8 southern provinces, this increase 
-11 h - to com trom with1n and not through immigration. 
'The whole r ion outh ot the t'ittheenth parallel of nor. 
latltu4 boom _,during the autum ani winter months,a hot.;-
be 0 t ar1 1 t v r ot an extremely venomous type. This 
18 o.tn, to th eoay ot the rank veg1 tation of the Blue J '. 
t • tor. t. to the pestilential swamps of the Whi te 
11.. r~p n n 'Egyptians quicll,. succumb to the effect 
ot th1 lar1., ins it practically impossible for them 
to t y in th • r'gions dur1ng these seasons ot the year. 
Th. qu tlon ot the education ot the Soudanese is 
ot . it 1 1 portane. in t leas t two ways. First it will ~: 
or t in the Rou ane • a desire to better his condition 
in 11t.; con ,It 18 wi thin the Soudan itself' that the 
GO rent mu.t look tor its future employees. The latter 
1. per-hap the or important reason. Mr.Currie,th! Directot-
Oenar 1 or . uc.atlon 8I\ys;"It would,indeed,be diffIcult to 
• .rate the importance ot endeavorl~g to create an ~du-
o t 01a. i n t h Soudan wi t h as little delay as posslble. 
By an t. Class ,however,I do not reter to higher.educa-
t Ion I> lDU t elapse before any but an extremely 1l.mi ted 
------------------------------------
1 _ R po~t on th ~oudan by Sir WeillISiam99 G)arstin. 
( B1u Book---~pt . No.. • 
2. Report OD the ~oudan tor 1902. 
( Blue Book---E.sy. pt. No.1. 1903.) t d d ath 
Iting in the final ' defea an e -ot t h oper tioDar 8U .. N 24 1899 In the last days 
of the Khall! nea r Gedid on hovE .. p'tian·army and Gov.-Gen. 
ot 1899 h b '0 me Strdaro! t e ~. 
at t h . . Qud 11 ,Qn_J>oei tion. he stll). · hQ14~ h . 
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numb r ot young Sudanese will be able to profit by educa-
tion of an aflv no type. What is now mail!l.ly requirell is to 
imp l"'t suoh knOwledge ot reading,writing,and arithmetic 
to 0 rt 1ft number ot young men as will eRable them to 
oooupy with a van tag the 6ubo.rdinate places . im the admin-
1 tra t10n 0'[ t~& country. Th need of such a class is " 
8 r 1y felt. There are' at present five establishments, 
1n th . Sou antin wh1eh instruction 1s given,to a certain ex-
t nt , 1 ~nglih . Th y ar Gordon College at Khartoum, ana 
t'ourpr1 roy sohoole at Khartoum,Omdurman,WaEly HaIfa, anci 
~u kin. At B rb r there is also a government sehool in Which 
in truct10n 1 Siv n only in Arabic. There are at present 
bout 1x hun red pupils in attendance at these schools ana 
report ahow that ... ry favorable progress is being made in 
th lr tr 1ning. 
t the Soudan mainly requires,in Qrder that ' its 
prOIl'" 8 tow r prosp rity may be rapid and sure,is a cde-
cid 1mprov m nt 1a the means ot co~nieation which at . 
pre ent exlat .Th rear. but two li1'188 of railway operating 
in th ~oun n both ot these are in the reiion aorth of 
rtou .On 1 trom Wa y HaIfa to Kerma.,near Dongola,and 
th other- trom y Hal1'a to Khartoum. The former is of Ii ttll 
pr otio 1 U8 nd w111 probably be close& before long,as 
th ," t.rlal can b. used to a better advantage ~lsewhere. 
Th 1. t t . r 1s very important and its importance is increas-
ing r p1dl • It tOrm8 th only practical means of traie 
oonnection wi th the outer world. However a new road has 
ju t b n begun" to opera te between Suakin and Berber ,which 
w111h n compl t d at tract the greater part of the import 
, 8 port tra • ot t h Soudan. Ruakin is the natural port 
or the ~ou n and once oonnected with Berber by railroaa 
it 111 b ooe ot cons iderable importance as a port.Outside 
ot th. r 111"'0 ds th internal communica tions are extreme-
ly poor . Tra mus t be carried on, between centers,by means 
or c 1, nd over ro d8 which only camels can travel. 
Th il an it. t ributari es form a highway for 
in t · rnal co ro hleh un 81'" the present condi tions is 
vaetly 1 ort nt. It is the only means,il'l fact,of advan-
t ,eously re ching th Upper Nile Provinces. Beyon.ti FashodBt 
hOwev r,eo.mmunication by river has been almost entirely cut 
oft by the presence of what i8 known as the Sudd,which com-
pl t 1y bl ocks the river against traffic. This Sudu is a 
r a k aro th of yar1 0U8 water plants,re~d8 and grass~s,which 
to~. in the sluggi8h waters of the Whlte Nile and lts 
tr1 bu ta r1 " densely covering the surface of the stream for 
Si r Ru olt C . ~1.t1n 18 a native ot Austria where he span 
hi youth.In 1878,at the age of twenty-tllo,he left Vienna 
for th Roudan at the p raonal invitation of Gen.Gordon. He 
" 8 appoint by Gordon as Gov.-Gen. of the province of 
D rtur.He h 1 th1e position until I884 when ~e .as capture 
by th Dervishe s and held for ten years.Escaplng he took ax 
"AlWUlItid .. ~*.~ftt :in :nE.~%lIn »£ ipriBlIJIl,XjQ~j*~. 
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Milea. These plants grow into an inextricable tangle fonn-
ing a great barrier ot weeds varing from one foot to six or 
ight fee t in thickness. So close ani compact is this mass 
th t men can walk about upon it with perfect safety. It is 
impossible for even the moat powerful steamers to force 
their way through such a barrier ana when it is once formed 
th r is but one way to again open the stream to navigation 
A force of men must be detailed to begin at the down stream 
8i e of the ma88 and cut it up into small blocks allowing 
it to float away with the current. This metho& has been 
U8 d by the 'English with such success that in 1903 it was 
.vi ant that a complete fre dom of navigation of the waters 
of the upper Nile would soon be securea. The improvement of 
riv 1'" transportation is of much importance in the cievelope-
ment or th ~oudan and a considerable flotilla of Govern-
m nt eteamers now operate on the Blue ana White Niles. 
The Administration has, since the reconquest was 
ftect d,coneide1"'ed that telegraphic communication is 
8ssential to the developement of the ~oudaR. Connection by 
t legr ph i8 no established between Khartoum and Tewfikieh 
at t he junction of the White Nile and the ~obat river,with 
Ro aires on t he Blue Nile,and with Galabat on the Atbara. 
In th construction of telegraph lines im most parts of the 
Rou an it i8 necessary to place the poles upon steel bases 
owing to the p1"'eyal nee of white ants which eat the wood 
jU8t at the surface of the ground. 
The agricultural possibilities in the Soudan are 
still undeveloped . Th main reason for this (the lack of 
populati on) has already b en discuss • The best agricul-
t ral Ian s are round along the Blue Nile,which in times . 
ot floo carries a gr at amount of organic matter ana 
deposits it over the flooded r egion making the soil extreme-
ly rich. The di s tricts along the White Nile are not nearly 
80 goo as ther is very littl organic matter carried by 
the floo waters of that etream,and what is carrie. is fil. 
t r d out,in the upper cours8s,by the heavy growth of weeds 
in the 8wamps . As a result the soil here is light ana does 
not support continual cultivation. It does not compare ,in 
fe rtility and productivenes8 ,with the soil along the Blue . 
Nil •• The natives along the White Nile never cultivate land 
fo r more than three years in. succession,at the encii of which 
time they seek out a fr sh area for cultivation. There is 
little doubt however,that under a good system of fertili-
zation the s011 of this region eoulcil be ma ... very produc~ 
t1v as t he rainfall 1s abundant. At present those crops 
a ctive part in the campaign for the recapture of Khartoum, 
1896-99 . He became a Major-G neral in the 'Egyptian army. 
In 1900 he was appointe~ Inspector-General of the ~oudan, ~ 
whi ch position he still holds. 
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which ripen duri~g the winter months are being mainly de-
veloped. Througll~ , the northern half of the Soudan,in some 
parts more than others, irrigation is necessary for the rull 
~evelop8ment of certain crope. Accordingly plaas are beiDg 
worked out by the Government,in oreier that a plenti ,tul sup-
ply of water may be readily and easily supplied at all 
times,especially those of deficient rainfall. Such plans 
apply chiefly to the Blue Nile districts where the soil 
properly irrigate4 Offers ~reat promises in the production 
of wheat and cotton. ~xpe~~~ts with both wheat and cotton 
are being made at the expense of the Government,but the 
successful production of these crops will depend largely 
upon the successful completion and operation of the Suakin-
Berber railroad,whlch will furnish an easily and cheaply 
reached port of exportation. 
The Soudan,then,under English rule,is gradually 
immerging f~,l1m the s ta te in to which it had fallen under 
Dervish rule. A country which had been allowed to lapse 
into barbarism has again been started on the highro&a to 
moral anCii nlaterial improvement. This fact,if no other,is 
sufficient to aispose of any argument that England has no 
right in the Souda.n. We have seen how 'England has gradually 
come into the control of Egypt. Whether this has been ac-
complished as the result of any definately conceived policy 
or merely for.m the force of circumstances,will probably 
never be fully known. Yet the fact remains that 'England is 
the virtual protector of 'Egypt. 'Egypt by right of occupa-
tiom,or geographieal position,economic cORsi~eratien,an~ ~ 
historical tradition is the lawful owner of the Souaan. And 
'Englana,as the protector of Egypt, is bound to maimtain the 
'Egyptian control of the Soudan. ' The possession of the Soudan 
is absolu tly necessary to 'Egypt . for two reasons, firs t, it 
places the entire course of the Nile,on which the prosperity 
of 'Egypt aepende,in the hanas of those who are responsible 
for her government and are deeply interested iR her welfar~ 
second,it frees Egypt from the possibility of barbarious 
invasions,which was a continual menace during the Dervish 
rule. 
In 1884 General Gordon wrote; "The Soudan is a useles 
possession,ever was so and ever will be so." Colonel stewart 
1ft his report on the Soudan aBald;"I quite agree with 
General Gordon,that the Soudan is an expensive ana useless 
p08sessMnr.·. II~ 'ltcbm an economic pOint of view the Soudan has, 
so far,bbrne out the opinion of these two men. However,Lorcii 
Cromer,the present British Consul-General in Egypt,in his 
I. Report on the Soudan for I903,. 
(Blue Book---Egypt. No.1. 1904.) 
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report on the Soudan :for 1903 says; "Wi thout incurring a 
charge of $xcessiveoptimism,it may be anticipated that, 
with the judicious expenQiture of capital,and the contin-
uous application of a system of government such as that 
which is now being skilfully directed by Sir Reginald 
Winga te and his staff, the future of the' Soudan ill be far 
less gloomy than was predicted by Gordon and Stewart. But 
progress will be necessarjly , slow." 
I =# 
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